laid down in this section, it manifestly
follows, that a right of private judgment about matters of religion
belongs to every man, and ought to be exercised by every Christian.
Christians are expressly required to examine and prove every
doctrine by the unerring rule of the Word of God.—Isaiah 8:20; 1
John 4:1. They ought to be ready to render a reason of the hope
which is in them (1 Peter 3:15); and this none can do who receive
the doctrines and commandments of men with implicit faith and blind
obedience. Whatever is not done in faith, nor accompanied with a
personal persuasion of the obligation or lawfulness of it in the
sight of God, is pronounced to be sin.—Romans 14:23.

It follows no less clearly, from the principles here laid down, that
when lawful superiors command what is contrary to the Word of God,
or beside it, in matters of faith and worship, their commands do not
bind the conscience. The obedience which Scriptures command us to
render to lawful superiors—whether parents, or husbands, or
magistrates—is not unlimited; there are cases in which disobedience
becomes a duty. No one doubts that the precept, "Children, obey your
parents in all things," is a command to obey them only in the
exercise of their rightful parental authority, and imposes no
obligation to implicit and passive obedience. The case is equally
plain with regard to the command, "Wives submit to your own
husbands." And it cannot be questioned that the obedience due to
magistrates is also limited. The precept, "Let every soul be subject
to the higher powers" must be understood as a command to obey
magistrates only in the exercise of their rightful authority, and in
all things lawful. The same inspired teachers who enjoined in such
general terms obedience to rulers, themselves uniformly and openly
disobeyed them whenever their commands were inconsistent with other
and higher obligations. "We ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts
5:29), was the principle which they allowed, and on which they
acted. When the apostles were charged by the Jewish Council to speak
no more in the Name of Jesus, their unhesitating answer was:
"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more
than unto God, judge you. For we cannot but speak the things which
we have seen and heard." Acts 4:19, 20. No command to do anything
morally wrong can be binding on the conscience.

From the principles here laid down, some have inferred that civil
authority is wholly inapplicable to matters of religion. Nothing,
however, can be farther from the design of the Confession than to
countenance this notion. That there is a lawful exercise of civil
power about religious matters, the compilers of the Confession
clearly teach, in the fourth section of this chapter, and also in
chapter 23. And as it was not their design, in this section, to
condemn this exercise of civil authority, so no such doctrine can
justly be inferred from the words; for, "if they condemn all
exercise of civil authority," to use the language of Dr. M'Crie,
"then they condemn also all exercise of every other species of human
authority about these things, whether ecclesiastical, parental, etc.
Is it not equally true, that God has left the conscience 'free from
the doctrines and commandments of men, which are in anything
contrary to his Word, or beside it, in matters of faith or worship,'
whether these be the doctrines and commandments of ministers or
magistrates, of masters or parents? Is not 'an implicit faith,' or
'an absolute and blind obedience,' unreasonable and sinful, whether
it be yielded to synods or parliaments? The design of the words is,
to teach the subordination of all human power to the sovereignty and
laws of God, particularly in matters of faith and worship. Nay, they
seem in that passage to be more immediately leveled against
invasions by Church authority, which have been fully as frequent and
pernicious in religion as those of civil rulers; such as the assumed
lordship of popes, councils, prelates, and convocations, in devising
new articles of faith, decreeing and imposing unscriptural rights
and ceremonies, canons, &c., here called 'the doctrines and
commandments of men,' in contradistinction from divine institutions;
as the traditions and superstitions of the Scribes and Pharisees,
superadded to the divine law, are called by our Lord. If civil
rulers concur in these impositions, or if they shall attempt the
like by their own sole authority, and the claim of an ecclesiastical
supremacy, this doctrine equally condemns their tyranny, and
teaches, that no error, will-worship, or any species of false
religion, by whoever commanded in Churches or States, can lay any
obligation on conscience, which is immediately subject to God alone.
But no such thing is taught, as that men's consciences are set free
from obedience to any human authority, when acting in entire
consistency with the Word of God, and enjoining nothing beside it,
or beyond its own proper limits; which authority of any kind may
certainly do."

SECTION 3. They who, upon pretense of Christian liberty, do practice
any sin, or cherish any lust, do thereby destroy the end of
Christian liberty; which is, that, being delivered out of the hands
of our enemies, we might serve the Lord without fear, in holiness
and righteousness before him, all the days of our life.

SECTION 4. And because the powers which God has ordained, and the
liberty which Christ has purchased, are not intended by God to
destroy, but mutually to uphold and preserve one another; they who,
upon pretense of Christian liberty, shall oppose any lawful power,
or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical,
resist the ordinance of God. And for their publishing of such
opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as are contrary to the
light of nature, or to the known principles of Christianity, whether
concerning faith, worship, or conversation; or to the power of
godliness; or such erroneous opinions or practices, as either in
their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining
them, are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ
has established in the Church; they may lawfully be called to
account, and proceeded against by the censures of the Church, and by
the power of the civil magistrate.

Exposition of 20.3–20.4

The liberty pleaded for in our Confession is not absolute and
uncontrollable. To assert that men have a right to think and act as
they please, without respect to the moral law, and without being
responsible to God, would be atheistic. And, if men are considered
as socially united, and as placed under government, their natural
rights, in religious as well as in civil things, must be liable to
restraint and regulations, so far as the interests and ends of
society require. Accordingly, the Confession, in the above sections,
proceeds to guard the doctrine of liberty of conscience against
abuse, first, in reference to the authority of God in his law; and,
secondly, in reference to the authorities on earth, civil and
ecclesiastical. With respect to the former it declares, that "they
who, upon pretense of Christian liberty, do practice any sin, or
cherish any lust, do thereby destroy the end of Christian liberty."
God has not liberated the conscience from the obligation of his own
law; on the contrary, he requires every one to yield implicit and
prompt obedience to all things whatever he has commanded. To plead
for a liberty to practice any known sin, is to plead for
licentiousness; and for persons to indulge themselves in any corrupt
affections and practices, under a pretense of Christian liberty, is
to "use their liberty for an occasion to the flesh." With respect to
the latter, the Confession mentions certain things for which persons
of a certain description may be proceeded against, both by the civil
and ecclesiastical authorities. It is to be observed, however, that
the intention of this section is not to lay down the extent of the
provinces of these powers, but only to remove the plea of
conscience; and it ought to be understood, in consistency with their
acting each in its own province, without the one interfering with
the causes which come under the cognizance of the other. Although
civil rulers may restrain, and, when occasion requires, may punish
the more flagrant violations of the first table of the moral law,
such as blasphemy, the publishing of blasphemous opinions, and the
open and gross profanation of the Sabbath; yet they are to repress
these evils, not formally as sins, which is the prerogative of God,
nor as scandals, in which light they come under the cognizance of
the Church, but as crimes and injuries done to society.

All sound Presbyterians disclaim all intolerant or compulsory
measures with regard to matters purely religious. They maintain that
no man should be punished or molested on account of his religious
opinions or observances, provided there is nothing in these hurtful
to the general interests of society, or dangerous to the lawful
institutions of the country in which he lives. The section now under
consideration, however, has sometimes been represented as arming the
civil magistrate with a power to punish good and peaceable subjects
purely on account of their religious opinions and practices, or as
favorable to persecution for conscience' sake. In vindicating the
Confession from this serious charge, we shall avail ourselves of the
judicious remarks of Dr. M'Crie. "The design of section fourth,"
says that eminent author, "is to guard against the abuse of the
doctrine" of liberty of conscience "in reference to public
authority. 'And because the powers which God has ordained, and the
liberty which Christ has purchased, are not intended by God to
destroy, but mutually to uphold and preserve one another, they who,
upon pretense of Christian liberty, shall oppose any lawful power,
or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical,
resist the ordinance of God.' He who is the Lord of the conscience
has also instituted the authorities in Church and State; and it
would be in the highest degree absurd to suppose that he has planted
in the breast of every individual a power to resist, counteract, and
nullify his own ordinances. When public and private claims interfere
and clash, the latter must give way to the former; and when any
lawful authority is proceeding lawfully within its line of duty, it
must be understood as possessing a rightful power to remove out of
the way everything which necessarily obstructs its progress. The
Confession proceeds, accordingly, to state: 'And for their
publishing of such opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as
are contrary to the light of nature; or to the known principles of
Christianity whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation, or
to the power of godliness; or such erroneous opinions or practices
as, either in their own nature or in the manner of publishing and
maintaining them, are destructive to the external peace and order
which Christ has established in the Church; they may lawfully be
called to account, and proceeded against by the censures of the
Church, and by the power of the civil magistrate.' Now, this does
not say that all who publish such opinions, and maintain such
practices as are mentioned may be proceeded against, or punished (if
the substitution of this word shall be insisted for) by the civil
magistrate; nor does it say that any good and peaceable subject
shall be made liable to this process simply on the ground of
religious opinions published, and practices maintained by him. For,
in the first place, persons of a particular character are spoken of
in this paragraph, and these are very different from good and
peaceable subjects. They are described in the former sentence as
'they who oppose lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it,' and
'resist the ordinance of God.' The same persons are spoken of in the
sentence under consideration, as appears from the copulative and the
relative. It is not said, 'Any one for publishing,' &c., but, 'they
who oppose any lawful power,' &c., 'for their publishing,' etc. In
the second place, this sentence specifies some of the ways in which
these persons may become chargeable with the opposition mentioned,
and consequently 'may be called to account;' but it does not assert
that even they must or ought to be prosecuted for every avowed
opinion or practice of the kind referred to. All that it necessarily
implies is, that they may be found opposing lawful powers, or the
lawful exercise of them in the things specified; and that they are
not entitled to plead a general irresponsibility in matters of that
kind. Notwithstanding such a plea, 'they may be called to account,
and proceeded against.' For, be it observed, it is not the design of
this paragraph to state the objects of Church censure or civil
prosecution; its proper and professed object is to interpose a check
on the abuse of liberty of conscience, as operating to the prejudice
of just and lawful authority. It is not sin as sin, but as scandal,
or injurious to the spiritual interests of Christians, that is the
proper object of Church censure; and it is not for sins as such, but
for crimes, that persons become liable to punishment by magistrates.
The compilers of the Confession were quite aware of these
distinctions, which were then common. Some think that if the process
of the magistrate had been limited to offences 'contrary to the
light of nature,' it would have been perfectly justifiable; but the
truth is, that it would have been so only on the interpretation now
given. To render an action the proper object of magistratic
punishment, it is not enough that it be contra to the law of God,
whether natural or revealed; it must, in one way or another, strike
against the public good of society. He who 'provides not for his
own, especially those of his own house', sins against 'the light of
nature,' as also does he who is 'a lover of pleasures more than of
God;' there are few who will plead that magistrates are bound to
proceed against, and punish every idler and belly-God. On the other
hand, there are opinions and practices 'contrary to the known
principles of Christianity', or grafted upon them, which, either in
their own nature, or from the circumstances with which they may be
clothed, may prove so injurious to the welfare of society in
general, or of particular nations, or of their just proceedings, or
of lawful institutions established in them, as to subject their
publishers and maintainers to warrantable coercion and punishment.
As one point to which these may relate, I may mention the external
observance and sanctification of the Lord's day, which can be known
only from 'the principles of Christianity,' and is connected with
all the particulars specified by the Confession, 'faith, worship,
conversation, the power of godliness, and the external order and
peace of the Church.' That many other instances of a similar
description can be produced, will be denied by no sober thinking
person who is well acquainted with Popish tenets and practices, and
with those which prevailed among the English sectaries during the
sitting of th